MITRE ATT&CK: Mapping Events to Tactics & Techniques
Theory
Prerequisites
- COA-K001: SOC Architecture & Alert Lifecycle
Why This Lesson Matters
ATT&CK is the lingua franca of modern security operations. Detection rules reference technique IDs. Threat intelligence reports cite tactic groups. Pentest findings map to sub-techniques. An analyst who cannot navigate ATT&CK and attach IDs to their observations produces investigation notes that are harder to correlate, harder to share, and harder to improve upon.
1. ATT&CK Structure
MITRE ATT&CK is a knowledge base of adversary behaviours observed in real intrusions, organised hierarchically:
Enterprise ATT&CK
└── Tactic (14 total) — the adversary's goal
└── Technique (hundreds) — how the goal is achieved
└── Sub-technique (thousands) — specific variant
Tactics answer why — what the adversary is trying to accomplish at this stage. Techniques answer what — the general approach. Sub-techniques answer how exactly — the specific implementation.
Example:
Tactic: TA0006 — Credential Access
Technique: T1003 — OS Credential Dumping
Sub-technique: T1003.001 — LSASS Memory
1.1 The 14 Enterprise Tactics
| ID | Tactic | SOC detection focus |
|---|---|---|
| TA0001 | Initial Access | Phishing, exploit, valid accounts |
| TA0002 | Execution | Script interpreters, WMI, scheduled tasks |
| TA0003 | Persistence | Registry run keys, services, cron |
| TA0004 | Privilege Escalation | SUID, token impersonation, UAC bypass |
| TA0005 | Defense Evasion | Log clearing, masquerading, obfuscation |
| TA0006 | Credential Access | LSASS dump, Kerberoasting, keylogging |
| TA0007 | Discovery | Account/network enumeration, port scan |
| TA0008 | Lateral Movement | Pass-the-hash, RDP, SMB |
| TA0009 | Collection | Screen capture, clipboard, file staging |
| TA0010 | Exfiltration | C2 channel, DNS, cloud storage |
| TA0011 | Command & Control | HTTP(S) C2, DNS tunnelling, encrypted channel |
| TA0040 | Impact | Ransomware, wipe, DoS |
| TA0042 | Resource Development | Infra setup, account creation (pre-attack) |
| TA0043 | Reconnaissance | OSINT, scanning (pre-attack) |
1.2 High-Priority Techniques for L1 Analysts
These techniques generate the highest alert volume in most SOC environments:
| Technique | ID | Common detection source | Alert signal |
|---|---|---|---|
| PowerShell | T1059.001 | Sysmon 1, Event 4688 | -EncodedCommand, -WindowStyle Hidden |
| Windows Command Shell | T1059.003 | Sysmon 1 | cmd.exe spawned by unusual parent |
| Scheduled Task | T1053.005 | Event 4698 | New task created outside change window |
| Create/Modify System Process | T1543.003 | Event 7045 | New service with suspicious ImagePath |
| OS Credential Dumping: LSASS | T1003.001 | Sysmon 10 | lsass.exe access by non-system process |
| Account Discovery | T1087 | Event 4798/4799 | net user, Get-LocalUser burst |
| Remote Services: SMB | T1021.002 | Event 4624 type 3 | Lateral logon from workstation to server |
| Exfiltration over C2 | T1041 | Firewall, NDR | Large outbound to new external IP |
| Data Encrypted for Impact | T1486 | EDR, Sysmon 11 | Rapid .encrypted file creation |
2. Using ATT&CK in SOC Practice
2.1 Mapping an Alert to ATT&CK
Step 1: Identify the event type (process creation, network connection, file creation, auth event). Step 2: Look at what the event describes behaviourally (a new service being installed = persistence). Step 3: Navigate to the tactic, then find the technique that matches. Step 4: Check sub-techniques for specificity.
Example: Sysmon Event 1 shows powershell.exe launched by winword.exe with argument -EncodedCommand JABmAGw...
- Behaviour: Script interpreter launched by document application with obfuscated argument
- Tactic: TA0002 — Execution (and possibly TA0005 — Defense Evasion for the encoding)
- Technique: T1059.001 — Command and Scripting Interpreter: PowerShell
- Sub-technique context: The encoding is consistent with T1027 — Obfuscated Files or Information
In your investigation note: "PowerShell execution from Word parent process with base64-encoded command — T1059.001 / T1027 — investigate encoded payload."
2.2 ATT&CK Navigator
The ATT&CK Navigator (https://mitre-attack.github.io/attack-navigator/) is a heat-map interface where you can: - Highlight which techniques your detection coverage covers - Map a threat actor's known TTPs to identify detection gaps - Compare two threat profiles side by side
For SOC work: export your SIEM detection rules as a Navigator layer and compare against a relevant threat actor's profile to find what you are blind to.
2.3 Threat Intelligence Integration
CTI reports use ATT&CK as their vocabulary. When a CISA advisory says "this actor uses T1566.001 (Spearphishing Attachment) for initial access and T1053.005 (Scheduled Tasks) for persistence," a SOC analyst should:
- Check whether their SIEM has detection rules for T1566.001 and T1053.005
- Run a threat hunt for any undetected instances of these techniques in the last 30 days
- If no rule exists, write one or escalate to L3
3. Documenting with ATT&CK IDs
Every investigation note or incident ticket should reference technique IDs for events that map to ATT&CK:
Before (unprofessional):
Saw some suspicious PowerShell. Checked the command line, it was encoded. Escalated to L2.
After (professional):
Sysmon Event 1 at 14:32:17 UTC on WS-042: powershell.exe (PID 4872) spawned by winword.exe (PID 3201). CommandLine contains -EncodedCommand flag consistent with T1059.001. Decoded payload (base64) reveals download cradle to hxxp://185[.]220[.]101[.]5/update.ps1 — consistent with T1105 (Ingress Tool Transfer). Escalating as P2-TP — potential phishing-delivered execution chain.
The second version is actionable, searchable, shareable with CTI, and legally defensible.
4. Common Mistakes
Mistake 1: Mapping to the wrong tactic. A credential dump is Credential Access (TA0006), not Execution, even though it runs as a process. Focus on the goal of the action, not the mechanism.
Mistake 2: Stopping at the technique level. T1059 (Command and Scripting Interpreter) has 9 sub-techniques. T1059.001 (PowerShell) and T1059.003 (Windows Command Shell) have very different detection approaches. Always drill down.
Mistake 3: Using ATT&CK IDs as a substitute for evidence. Writing "T1003.001 detected" without showing the Sysmon Event 10 that triggered it is incomplete. The ID labels the behaviour; evidence proves it occurred.
5. Practice Exercises
- Map each of the following observations to the correct ATT&CK tactic and technique:
- A script creates a new scheduled task named
Windows Update Helperthat executesC:Tempupdater.exeat logon - A process reads
C:WindowsSystem32lsass.exememory via OpenProcess with PROCESS_VM_READ - A user account enumerates all domain users with
net user /domainandGet-ADUser -Filter * -
Files on a file server are renamed with
.lockedextension at 500 files/second -
You are given a CTI report stating that a threat actor uses T1566.002, T1204.002, T1059.001, T1547.001, and T1041. Build a coverage table: for each technique, write one SIEM data source and one field/value you would query to detect it.
-
Open the ATT&CK Navigator and create a layer highlighting the 9 techniques from the "High-Priority Techniques" table in Section 1.2. Export as JSON.
6. Lab
Assessment mode: quiz
You are presented with 10 event log excerpts. For each excerpt, select the correct ATT&CK tactic and the correct technique ID from a provided list. A score of ≥ 80% is required.
7. Framework Alignment
| Framework | Role | Competency | Confidence |
|---|---|---|---|
| CCSSF-COA | Cyber Security Operations Analyst | ATT&CK application in daily triage | High |
| CCSSF-CTI | OSINT & CTI | TTP-based intelligence production | High |
| CCSSF-CIR | Cyber Incident Responder | Incident classification and ATT&CK mapping | High |
| NICE 2.2.0 | Cyber Defense Analyst | K0177 — Cybersecurity attack taxonomy | High |
8. Further Reading
- MITRE ATT&CK — https://attack.mitre.org — Primary reference; use the search and matrix views
- ATT&CK Navigator — https://mitre-attack.github.io/attack-navigator/
- MITRE ATT&CK for SOC Analysts (free training) — https://mad.mitre-engenuity.org
- Sigma Rules project — https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma — Community detection rules mapped to ATT&CK
Learning Objectives
["Navigate the ATT&CK matrix to find a technique by tactic context and apply the correct tactic, technique, and sub-technique IDs to three described attacker behaviours", "Write a professional investigation note that cites ATT&CK IDs, evidence references, and a severity classification for a described alert scenario", "Build an ATT&CK Navigator coverage layer for a provided set of SIEM detection rules and identify at least two detection gaps"]
Lesson Outline
Prerequisites → Why this matters → ATT&CK structure (tactics → techniques → sub-techniques) → 14 enterprise tactics table → High-priority techniques for L1 analysts → Using ATT&CK in practice (step-by-step mapping, Navigator, CTI integration) → Professional documentation with ATT&CK IDs (before/after example) → Common mistakes → Practice exercises → Quiz lab → Framework alignment → Further reading